1.Introduction.
Let us remind that accordingly to naive set theory, any definable collection is a set. Let R be the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. If R qualifies as a member of itself, it would contradict its own definition as a set containing all sets that are not members of themselves. On the other hand, if such a set is not a member of itself, it would qualify as a member of itself by the same definition. This contradiction is Russell's paradox. In 1908, two ways of avoiding the paradox were proposed, Russell's type theory and the Zermelo set theory, the first constructed axiomatic set theory. Zermelo's axioms went well beyond Frege's axioms of extensionality and unlimited set abstraction, and evolved into the now-canonical Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZFC. "But how do we know that ZFC is a consistent theory, free of contradictions? The short answer is that we don't; it is a matter of faith (or of skepticism)"-E.Nelson wrote in his not published paper [1] . However, it is deemed unlikely that even ZFC 2 which is a very stronger than ZFC harbors an unsuspected contradiction; it is widely believed that if ZFC 2 were inconsistent, that fact would have been uncovered by now. This much is certain -ZFC 2 is immune to the classic paradoxes of naive set theory: Russell's paradox, the Burali-Forti paradox, and Cantor's paradox. Remark 1.1. Note that in this paper we view the second order set theory ZFC 2 under the Henkin semantics [2] , [3] and under the full second-order semantics [4] , [5] .Thus we interpret the wff's of ZFC 2 language with the full second-order semantics as required in [4] , [5] . Designation 1.1. We will be denote by ZFC 2
Hs
set theory ZFC 2 with the Henkin semantics and we will be denote by ZFC 2 fss set theory ZFC 2 with the full second-order semantics.
Remark 1.2.There is no completeness theorem for second-order logic with the full second-order semantics. Nor do the axioms of ZFC 2 fss imply a reflection principle which ensures that if a sentence Z of second-order set theory is true, then it is true in some (standard or nonstandard) model M ZFC 
But obviously this is a contradiction. Let Th be some fixed, but unspecified, consistent formal theory. For later convenience, we assume that the encoding is done in some fixed formal second order theory S and that Th contains S.The sense in which S is contained in Th is better exemplified than explained: if S is a formal system of a second order arithmetic Z 2
and Th is, say, ZFC 2
, then Th contains S in the sense that there is a well-known embedding, or interpretation, of S in Th. Since encoding is to take place in S, it will have to have a large supply of constants and closed terms to be used as codes. (e.g. in formal arithmetic, one has 0, 1, . . . .) S will also have certain function symbols to be described shortly.To each formula, , of the language of Th is assigned a closed term,  
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and where 
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Then we define a theory Th i1 as follows Th i1  Th i   i . Using Lemma 2.1 we will rewrite the condition (2.9) symbolically as follows 
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Remark1. Notice that predicate Pr Th
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Then we define theory Th i1 as follows: Th i1  Th i   i . Using Lemma 2.2 we will rewrite the condition (2.11) symbolically as follows
2. 12 
Remark2. Notice that predicate Pr Th
We will rewrite the condition (2.13) symbolically as follows
Then we define a theory Th i1 as follows: Th i1  Th i .
(iv) Suppose that a statement (2.15) is satisfied
We will rewrite the condition (2.15) symbolically as follows
Then we define a theory 
Then we said that, a set y is a Th # -set iff there is exist one-place open wff x such that y  x  . We write yTh
Proof. Let us consider an one-place open wff x such that conditions ( * ) or ( * * ) is satisfied, i.e. Th #  ∃!x  x  . We note that there exists countable collection ℱ  of the one-place open wff's ℱ    n x n∈ℕ such that: (i) x ∈ ℱ  and (ii)
or of the equivalent form
where we set x   1 x 1 ,  n x 1    n,1 x 1  and x   x 1 . We note that any collection ℱ  k   n,k x n∈ℕ , k  1, 2, . . . such above defines an unique set x  k , i.e.
. is no part of the ZFC 2 , i.e. collection ℱ  k there is no set in sense of ZFC 2 . However that is no problem, because by using Gödel numbering one can to replace any collection
It is easy to prove that any collection
. is a Th # -set.This is done by Gödel encoding [8] , [10] of the statament (2.19) by Proposition 2.1 and by axiom schema of separation [9] . Let g n,k  g n,k x k , k  1, 2, . . be a Gödel number of the wff  n,k x k . Therefore gℱ k   g n,k  n∈ℕ , where we set ℱ k  ℱ  k , k  1, 2, . . and
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Let g n,k  n∈ℕ  k∈ℕ be a family of the all sets g n,k  n∈ℕ . By axiom of choice [9] one obtain unique set ℑ ′  g k  k∈ℕ such that ∀kg k ∈ g n,k  n∈ℕ . Finally one obtain a set ℑ from a set ℑ ′ by axiom schema of replacement [9] .Thus one can define a Th [10] ). Let us define now predicate
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We define now a set Θ k such that
But obviously definitions (2.19) and (2.25) is equivalent by Proposition 2.1.
 ∃ c follows immediately by using statement ∃ℑ and axiom schema of separation [4] . (ii) follows immediately from countability of a set ℑ. Proposition 2.5. A set  c is inconsistent. Proof.From formla (2.18) one obtain
From formula (2.21) and Proposition 2.1 one obtain
and therefore
But this is a contradiction. 
Then we define a theory Th i1 as follows Th i1  Th i   i . Using Lemma 2.1 we will rewrite the condition (2.24) symbolically as follows
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(ii) Suppose that a statement (2.26) is satisfied
Then we define theory Th i1 as follows: Th i1  Th i   i . Using Lemma 2.2 we will rewrite the condition (2.26) symbolically as follows
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(iii) Suppose that a statement (2.28) is satisfied
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We will rewrite the condition (2.28) symbolically as follows 
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We will rewrite the condition (2.30) symbolically as follows 
